Discourses, book 1, chapter 4
Of progress and improvement
Entretiens, livre Ier, chapitre IV
Sur le progrès
And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which I have named.
Qu’est-ce qui est donc ton fait ? Ton fait, c’est de désirer les choses ou de les fuir, de manière à ne pas les manquer ou à ne pas y tomber ; c’est de t’y porter ou de les repousser, de manière à ne pas pécher ; c’est d’affirmer ou de douter, de manière à ne pas te tromper. Le premier de ces trois points est le plus important et le plus nécessaire.
Discourses, book 3, chapter 2
In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency; and that we neglect the chief things
Entretiens, livre III, chapitre 2
Des choses auxquelles il faut exercer l’élève ; et de notre négligence de ce qu’il y a de plus important
There are three things in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire. The second concerns the movements (towards) and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgement, and generally it concerns the assents.
Il est trois choses qu’il faut apprendre par l’exercice à celui qui doit devenir un sage : d’abord à désirer et à redouter, pour qu’il ne manque jamais ce qu’il désire, et ne tombe jamais dans ce qu’il redoute ; en second lieu, à vouloir les choses et à les repousser, ou, plus simplement, à faire ce qu’il doit, pour qu’il agisse toujours suivant l’ordre et la raison, et sans négligence ; en troisième lieu, à ne jamais se tromper, à ne jamais juger au hasard, en un mot à bien donner son assentiment.
It can be inferred that the three topoi of philosophical exercise consist of
1.Desires and aversions (le désir et l’aversion; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ho peri tas orexeis kai tas ekkliseis)
2.Impulses to act and not to act (les tendances positives et négatives; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς, ho peri tas hormas kai aphormas)
3.Assents (l’assentiment; ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ho peri tas synkatatheseis)
One might be wondering why it must be these topoi that must be trained, as if there was no particular structure underlying them. An interesting analysis regarding this case can be found in Hadot. He said that the idea of three topoi in Epictetus had inspired the ternary schema in Marcus Aurelius’ Pensées, which had the following characteristics.
« Il est facile de constater que ces trois règles se réfèrent aux trois rapports fondamentaux qui définissent la situation de l'homme. Le premier thème, en effet, détermine le rapport de l'homme avec le cosmos, le second, le rapport de l'homme avec les autres hommes, le troisième, le rapport de l'homme avec lui-même [...] » [13]
Using the same pattern, we can say that to some extent the first topos (desires and aversions) concerns itself with the relationship between a human being and the universe; the second topos (impulses to act and not to act) with the relationship between human beings; and the third topos (assents) with the relationship inside the human being himself or herself. This pattern can be brought further to the three parts of philosophical discourse, which we have tackled. A human being deals with the universe (physics), with other human beings (ethics) and with himself or herself (logic).
It is also necessary that we provide justification for this pattern.[14] Regarding the exercise of desires and aversions, we can see that oftentimes people are afraid of losing something in the future or regret that they lost something in the past. This is because such things do not depend on us. Therefore, Epictetus told us to obtain the right desire for things that depend on us and see things that do not as indifferent. All things that do not depend on us undergo changes as willed by the universal nature, hence the need for learning physics and understand the universe.
Regarding the exercise of impulses, we must realise that we live in a particular place with others. Naturally, even though we acknowledge that social affairs are among the things that do not depend on us, and are thus indifferent, our reason leads us to behave properly so as to maintain the order of society. Involving ourselves in social and political affairs is still considered duties (kathekonta), appropriate actions to which our natural inclination is heading. And precisely it is the matter of ethics.
Regarding the exercise of assents, as human beings we wish to obtain the correct judgements on everything that happens to us. It is then imperative that we give only our assents to representations (phantasia) that are adequate and objective. We shall not mix up representations with value-judgements, which will inevitably result in one of the four passions. In this case, our logical capability is needed to form the judgement on each representation.
We can sum up our discussion in the following table.
Philosophical discourse
