Philosophical Education According to Epictetus
[caption id="" align="alignright" width="266" caption="Epictetus (c. 55-135 AD)"][/caption]
Philosophy in today's Western world has been predominantly perceived as part of the academe. Students enrol at a higher education institution, take a philosophy course, attend classes and undergo exams. It seems that philosophy is all about an academic discipline, a subject taught in universities.
Little do they know that a number of schools of thought recorded in history saw philosophy as a way of life, in lieu of a mere theory. This notion can be found not only in the Eastern world—in which philosophy pivots around a matter of leading an ethically good life—but also in the Western counterpart. And to some extent Stoicism belonged to this group. As a school of philosophy emerging after Plato and Aristotle, popularly known as Hellenistic philosophy, Stoicism put a heavy emphasis on the importance of self-control as a means of living in accordance with Nature.
This article then aims at explaining the general system of philosophy as perceived by Epictetus, a philosopher of the late Stoa. A brief biography of Epictetus will precede further explanations. Afterwards, the system of philosophical education taken from his teachings, as recorded by his student Flavius Arrianus, will follow. Finally, I will give some general remarks.
It should be noted that no attempt has been made to peruse texts written by or attributed to Epictetus’ contemporaries of the late Stoa, such as Musonius Rufus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, even though they might have inspired or have been inspired by Epictetus. Neither did I zero in on detailed Stoic doctrines requiring further studies, such as logic, physics and ethics.
As for the primary resources, I have utilised two versions of translation of the Diatribai and the Enchiridion: in English and French. The English translation of the former was made by George Long (1890) under the title The Discourses, while that of the latter was made by Nicholas White (1983) under the title The Handbook. The French equivalent of the Discourses came from V. Courdaveux (Entretiens, 1862) and that of the Handbook came from Jean-François Thurot (Manuel, 1899).
Life of Epictetus[1]
Due to limited resources, one can draw only a basic sketch of Epictetus’ life. The resources comprise references in the ancient texts and a number of allusions that Epictetus makes to his own life in the Discourses.
Epictetus was born in about 55 AD in Hierapolis, a Greek town in Asia Minor (now Pamukkale, in south-western Turkey). Prior to being a prominent philosopher, he used to be a slave of a very wealthy freedman named Epaphroditus, who was himself an administrative secretary in the court of Emperor Nero.
It is unknown when Epictetus went to Rome; however, researchers estimated that it must have been either (1) when Epaphroditus fled the capital before the year 68; or (2) after Domitian acceded to the throne in 81, who then allowed Epaphroditus to return and possibly to resume his position.
Epictetus then studied for a period of time under Musonius Rufus, who was a Roman senator and adherent of Stoicism. When finally obtaining freedom, he started lecturing on his own account.
Unfortunately, the edict of Emperor Domitian in 89, which forbid all philosophers from the Italian peninsula, forced him to leave Rome. At Nicopolis, which at that time was an important cultural centre in Epirus, on the Adriatic coast of northwest Greece, he managed to establish his own school. During this period he attracted quite a few upper-class Romans, one of whom was Flavius Arrianus (c.86–160), who would compose the Discourses and the Handbook.
Not only did his school gain a good reputation, Epictetus grew more and more renowned. He was recognised by Herodes Atticus (c.101–177), a teacher of Marcus Aurelius, as ‘the greatest of Stoics’—this notion was written by Aulus Gellius (c.125–c.165) in Attic Nights 1.2.6. Separately, Origen (Contra Celsum 6.2) noted that Epictetus had been more well-known in his day than had his predecessor Plato in his. Origen also quoted (Contra Celsum 7.53) a story told by author Celsus—possibly a contemporary of Epictetus in his youth—that when still a slave, Epictetus was tortured by his master who twisted his leg. Enduring the pain with complete composure, Epictetus warned Epaphroditus that his leg would break, and when it did break, he said, ‘There, did I not tell you that it would break?’
His popularity notwithstanding, Epictetus never married and had no children, but for reasons of benevolence he late in life adopted a child whose parents could not provide for its maintenance. He spent his lifetime teaching at the town until his demise in around 135.
Preliminary step: What philosophy is concerned about
Philosophy according to Epictetus is not simply a matter of acquiring knowledge on a particular theory. To him, philosophy is the art of living. What does it mean to take philosophy as the art of living? Before going any further, it behoves us to pay heed to the following quotation.
Discourses, book 1, chapter 15
What philosophy promises
Entretiens, livre Ier, chapitre XV
À quoi s’engage la philosophie ?
When a man was consulting him how he should persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied: Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. If it did philosophy would be allowing something which is not within its province. For as the carpenter’s material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter of the art of living is each man’s life. “What then is my brother’s?” That again belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. “In every circumstance I will maintain,” she says, “the governing part conformable to nature.” Whose governing part? “His in whom I am,” she says.
“How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me?” Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.
When the man, who was consulting him, said, “I seek to know this — how, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature?” Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time: let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is, then, the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man’s mind in so short a time and so easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.
Quelqu’un le consultait sur les moyens de persuader à son frère de ne plus vivre mal avec lui. La philosophie ne s’engage pas, lui dit-il, à procurer à l’homme quoi que ce soit d’extérieur ; autrement, elle s’occuperait de choses étrangères à ce qui est sa matière particulière. Le bois est la matière du charpentier ; l’airain est la matière du fondeur de statue ; l’art de vivre, à son tour, a pour matière dans chaque homme la vie de cet homme même. Que dire donc de la vie de ton frère ? Qu’elle relève de son savoir faire à lui ; mais que, par rapport au tien, elle est au nombre des choses extérieures, ainsi que l’est un champ, ainsi que l’est la santé, ainsi que l’est la gloire. Or, sur toutes ces choses la philosophie ne s’engage à rien. « Dans toutes les circonstances, dit-elle, je maintiendrai la partie maîtresse en conformité avec la nature. » — Mais la partie maîtresse de qui ? — De l’être dans lequel je suis.
— Comment donc faire pour que mon frère ne soit plus irrité contre moi ? — Amène-le-moi, et je lui parlerai ; mais je n’ai rien à te dire, à toi, au sujet de sa colère.
Celui qui le consultait ajouta : « Je te demande encore comment je pourrai me conformer à la nature, au cas où mon frère ne se réconcilierait pas avec moi. » Il lui répondit : « Aucune chose considérable ne se produit en un instant, pas plus que le raisin et les figues. Si tu me disais maintenant : je veux une figue, je te dirais : il faut du temps ; laisse l’arbre fleurir, puis les fruits y venir et mûrir. » Et, lorsque le fruit du figuier n’arrive pas à sa perfection d’un seul coup et en un instant, tu voudrais cueillir si facilement et si vite les fruits de la sagesse humaine ! Je te dirai, ne l’espère pas.
One can draw several aspects regarding philosophy based on the above-mentioned passage.
1.Philosophy does not concern itself with any external thing (quoi que ce soit d’extérieur), which includes any situation experienced by himself/herself or by other individuals—in the latter case, the anger of the man’s brother.
2.What philosophy actually concerns is maintaining one’s own governing part (la partie maîtresse, or hēgemonikon) conformable to Nature. It does not deal with the governing part of individuals other than himself or herself.
3.In order to maintain the governing part conformable to Nature, one has to set a certain amount of time (il faut du temps). Similar to plants, which require a certain period of time to grow from the seed until they blossom and bear fruit, this process cannot be completed right away.
Seen as the art of living, philosophy invites us to lead a life in which our governing part, or hēgemonikon, remains in accordance with Nature. But whose governing part can one bring in harmony with Nature? Philosophy insists that it is solely his or her own governing part—that is what philosophy promises: ἐν πάσῃ περιστάσει τηρήσω τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον (en pasē peristasei tērēsō to hēgemonikon kata physin echon). Consequently, philosophy promises nothing about changing the external situation that might affect us and lead us to emotions, mental diseases which are the product of faulty judgements.
That is why the man who asked for Epicetus’ advice was told to ‘be more concerned with his own emotional reaction to his brother’s anger than with his brother’s anger itself’.[2] Annoyed by his brother’s anger, the man can in fact cure his own mental diseases with philosophy; however, he can never treat his brother’s, precisely because only his brother can do so. Here Epictetus’ saying finds its resonance, ‘The matter of the art of living is each man’s life (l’art de vivre a pour matière dans chaque homme la vie de cet homme même).’
The two stages of philosophical education
Once a person accepts the condition that maintaining one’s hēgemonikon conformable to Nature requires time and effort, he or she will be ready to embark on the philosophical journey. John Sellars identifies Epictetus’ two stages of philosophical education: ‘first a study of philosophical discourse, followed by a practical training or apprenticeship conceived as a process of habituation and digestion.’[3] This division is based on a clear distinction, traditionally drawn by the Stoics, ‘between discourse about philosophy and the practice of philosophy itself’.[4] In the Discourses we can find a quotation pertinent to it.
Discourses, book 1, chapter 26
What is the law of life
Entretiens, livre Ier, chapitre XXVI
Que faut-il faire pour apprendre à vivre ?
First, then, philosophers exercise us in theory, which is easier; and then next they lead us to the more difficult things; for in theory, there is nothing which draws us away from following what is taught; but in the matters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is ridiculous, then, who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things.
Aussi les philosophes commencent-ils par nous exercer à la Logique, ce qui est plus facile ; puis il nous mènent par elle à ce qui est plus difficile. Dans la Logique, en effet, il n’y a jamais rien qui nous tire à soi pour nous empêcher de suivre ce que l’on nous enseigne ; mais dans la pratique, que de choses autour de nous pour nous entraîner dans un autre sens ! Il serait donc ridicule celui qui dirait qu’il veut commencer par la pratique ; car c’est chose mal aisée que de commencer parce qu’il y a de plus difficile.
In addition to the differentiation between exercising in theory (la Logique; ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας, epi tēs theōrias) and exercising in the matters of life (la pratique; ἐπὶ τῶν βιωτικῶν, epi tōn biōtikōn), Epictetus asserted that the former is easier to do than the latter. Therefore, one should start with the former and tackle the latter upon completion of the former.
What, then, does one learn at the first stage of philosophical education? It is popularly known that Stoicism sees philosophy as that which comprises three parts: logic, physics and ethics. Put it briefly, Stoic logic examines the way we gain knowledge, or epistemology, which consists of three stages: (1) representation (phantasia), (2) assent (sunkatathesis) to adequate representation (katalēptikē), and (3) comprehension (katalēpsis). Stoic physics covers a wide range of topics, including ontology, cosmology and psychology; but for our purposes, suffice it to say that ‘the close kinship between particular human beings and the cosmos as a whole’[5] leads to a belief that one can but wholeheartedly submit himself or herself to the active universal principle, Divine Providence. No one can be separated from this active principle because human soul (pneuma) and body are simply part of the cosmic soul and body.[6] Realising this interrelation, Stoic ethics teaches one how to behave in order to be the Sage, those who have reached apatheia or ataraxia, no longer disturbed by any external thing.
Some people might then be inclined to hold that logic and physics constitute the theoretical-discursive part as the study of the rules of discourse and the study of nature, respectively; while ethics, on the other hand, exclusively belongs to the practical stage. Such notion is considered incorrect by Pierre Hadot. He asserted that ‘both theoretical philosophical discourse and philosophy itself as it was lived and experienced were made up of three constituent parts’[7]. What Hadot wanted to say is that we cannot exclude ethics from the theoretical stage of philosophy—which Hadot referred to as ‘philosophical discourse’—, and so is it false to say that logic and physics are not taken into account at the practical stage of philosophy—which Hadot referred to as ‘philosophy itself’.[8]
To make things clear, we ought to find out: How is the relationship between these two stages?
On the one hand, each stage appears to be distinct from the other. In the theoretical stage, Hadot argued, the three parts of philosophy—logic, physics and ethics—were clearly differentiated, external from one another, because they had their own objects of explanations and developed in accordance with a logical succession; while in the practical stage one acts in an integrated fashion, which includes the three parts of philosophy (which we will discuss later) altogether without losing the unity of the exercise.
‘On this level [of philosophical practice], we are no longer concerned with theoretical logical—that is, the theory of correct reasoning—rather, we are concerned not to let ourselves be deceived in our everyday lives by false representations. We are no longer concerned with theoretical physics—the theory of the origin and evolution of the cosmos—we are concerned with being aware at every instant that we are parts of the cosmos, and that we must make our desires conform to this situation. We no longer do ethical theory—the definition and classification of virtues and duties—we simply act in an ethical way.’[9]
On the other hand, the two stages cannot be separated as if they were entirely independent from one another. The two stages are interrelated. Learning only philosophical discourse without putting it into practice is simply as futile as practising philosophy without having a strong theoretical foundation in mind; neither way will lead one to the Sage.
The same interrelation applies between the three parts of each stage: logic-ethics-physics in the theoretical stage, and the three areas (topoi) of philosophy in the practical stage. The unity of logic-ethics-physics was likened by different Stoics, Diogenes Laertius wrote, to an animal (which comprises bones and sinews, flesh and the soul) or an egg (which comprises eggshell, white and yolk).[10]
Meanwhile, the importance of recognising all topoi of philosophy is also confirmed by Epictetus in the Handbook. If one does not begin with practising theories and instead focuses only on expressing the theories in words, he or she would end up in a contradictory situation as in the following quotation:
Handbook, chapter 52
Manuel, chapitre LII
The first and most necessary aspect [τόπος] of philosophy is that of dealing with philosophical propositions, such as “not to hold to falsehood.” The second is that of demonstrations, for example, “Must one not hold to falsehood?” The third is that of the confirmation and articulation of these, for example, “Why is this a demonstration? What is demonstration? What is entailment? What is conflict? What is truth? What is falsity?”
Therefore the third is necessary because of the second, and the second because of the first; but the most necessary, and the one where one must rest, is the first. We, however, do it backwards, since we spend time in the third and all of our effort goes into it, and we neglect the first completely. Therefore we hold to falsehood, but we are ready to explain how it is demonstrated that one must not hold to falsehood.
La première partie de la philosophie et la plus essentielle, c’est de mettre en pratique les maximes, par exemple de ne pas mentir ; la seconde, ce sont les démonstrations, par exemple, d’où vient qu’il ne faut pas mentir ; la troisième est celle qui confirme et éclaircit les démonstrations elles-mêmes ; par exemple d’où vient que c’est une démonstration ? Qu’est-ce-qu’une démonstration ? Qu’est-ce que conséquence, incompatibilité, vrai, faux ?
Ainsi donc, la troisième partie est nécessaire à cause de la seconde, et la seconde à cause de la première ; mais la plus nécessaire, celle au delà de laquelle on ne peut plus remonter, c’est la première. Nous, nous agissons au rebours. Nous nous arrêtons à la troisième partie ; toute notre étude est pour elle, et nous négligeons complètement la première. Aussi nous mentons, mais nous savons sur le bout du doigt comment on démontre qu’il ne faut pas mentir.
All in all, the Stoic system, whether between the stages or between the parts of each stage, is highly interrelated that ‘no one part can be adequately understood without at least some grasp of the central concepts developed in the other parts’.[11]
Askesis as the practical stage of philosophy
We have seen that studying philosophical theories is not the same as putting them into practice, even though both can be impossibly separated from each other. This section then will discuss the more difficult stage of philosophy: the practical stage, which takes place in quotidian life. To begin with, Epictetus utilised the traditional distinction between things that depend on us and things that do not.
Handbook, chapter 1
Entretiens, chapitre I
Some things are up to us and some are not up to us. Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, aversions—in short, whatever is our own doing. Our bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our reputations, or our public offices, or, that is, whatever is not our own doing. The things that are up to us are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; the things that are not up to us are weak, enslaved, hindered, not our own.
Des choses les unes dépendent de nous, les autres ne dépendent pas de nous. Ce qui dépend de nous, ce sont nos jugements, nos tendances, nos désirs, nos aversions, en un mot tout ce qui est opération de notre âme ; ce qui ne dépend pas de nous, c’est le corps, la fortune, les témoignages de considération, les charges publiques, en un mot tout ce qui n’est pas opération de notre âme. Ce qui dépend de nous est, de sa nature, libre, sans empêchement, sans contrariété ; ce qui ne dépend pas de nous est inconsistant, esclave, sujet à empêchement, étranger.
1.The things that depend on us (ce qui dépend de nous; ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, eph’ hēmin) are whatever is our own doing (ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα, osa hēmetera erga), or, in other words, the acts of our own soul (ce qui est opération de notre âme).
2.The things that do not depend on us (ce qui ne dépend pas de nous; οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ouk eph’ hēmin) are whatever is not our own doing (οὐχ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα, ouch osa hēmetera erga), or, in other words, that which is not the acts of our own soul (ce qui n’est pas opération de notre âme).
We are only able to take control of things that depend on us; we are free to choose any of them. Conversely, about the things that do not depend on us, we can do nothing; those things depend instead ‘on the general course of nature and fate’.[12] This is, again, what philosophy promises (cf. Discourses I, 15); it does not pretend to change the external things, which are not up to us.
Cognisant of the distinction, we have to simply zero in on the things that depend on us. And so does the practical stage of philosophy lay its exercise (askesis) on them. According to Epictetus, there are three areas (topoi) that should be taken into account as the objects of philosophical exercise. The following passages clearly indicate them.
Discourses, book 1, chapter 4
Of progress and improvement
Entretiens, livre Ier, chapitre IV
Sur le progrès
And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which I have named.
Qu’est-ce qui est donc ton fait ? Ton fait, c’est de désirer les choses ou de les fuir, de manière à ne pas les manquer ou à ne pas y tomber ; c’est de t’y porter ou de les repousser, de manière à ne pas pécher ; c’est d’affirmer ou de douter, de manière à ne pas te tromper. Le premier de ces trois points est le plus important et le plus nécessaire.
Discourses, book 3, chapter 2
In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency; and that we neglect the chief things
Entretiens, livre III, chapitre 2
Des choses auxquelles il faut exercer l’élève ; et de notre négligence de ce qu’il y a de plus important
There are three things in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire. The second concerns the movements (towards) and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgement, and generally it concerns the assents.
Il est trois choses qu’il faut apprendre par l’exercice à celui qui doit devenir un sage : d’abord à désirer et à redouter, pour qu’il ne manque jamais ce qu’il désire, et ne tombe jamais dans ce qu’il redoute ; en second lieu, à vouloir les choses et à les repousser, ou, plus simplement, à faire ce qu’il doit, pour qu’il agisse toujours suivant l’ordre et la raison, et sans négligence ; en troisième lieu, à ne jamais se tromper, à ne jamais juger au hasard, en un mot à bien donner son assentiment.
It can be inferred that the three topoi of philosophical exercise consist of
1.Desires and aversions (le désir et l’aversion; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ho peri tas orexeis kai tas ekkliseis)
2.Impulses to act and not to act (les tendances positives et négatives; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς, ho peri tas hormas kai aphormas)
3.Assents (l’assentiment; ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ho peri tas synkatatheseis)
One might be wondering why it must be these topoi that must be trained, as if there was no particular structure underlying them. An interesting analysis regarding this case can be found in Hadot. He said that the idea of three topoi in Epictetus had inspired the ternary schema in Marcus Aurelius’ Pensées, which had the following characteristics.
« Il est facile de constater que ces trois règles se réfèrent aux trois rapports fondamentaux qui définissent la situation de l'homme. Le premier thème, en effet, détermine le rapport de l'homme avec le cosmos, le second, le rapport de l'homme avec les autres hommes, le troisième, le rapport de l'homme avec lui-même [...] » [13]
Using the same pattern, we can say that to some extent the first topos (desires and aversions) concerns itself with the relationship between a human being and the universe; the second topos (impulses to act and not to act) with the relationship between human beings; and the third topos (assents) with the relationship inside the human being himself or herself. This pattern can be brought further to the three parts of philosophical discourse, which we have tackled. A human being deals with the universe (physics), with other human beings (ethics) and with himself or herself (logic).
It is also necessary that we provide justification for this pattern.[14] Regarding the exercise of desires and aversions, we can see that oftentimes people are afraid of losing something in the future or regret that they lost something in the past. This is because such things do not depend on us. Therefore, Epictetus told us to obtain the right desire for things that depend on us and see things that do not as indifferent. All things that do not depend on us undergo changes as willed by the universal nature, hence the need for learning physics and understand the universe.
Regarding the exercise of impulses, we must realise that we live in a particular place with others. Naturally, even though we acknowledge that social affairs are among the things that do not depend on us, and are thus indifferent, our reason leads us to behave properly so as to maintain the order of society. Involving ourselves in social and political affairs is still considered duties (kathekonta), appropriate actions to which our natural inclination is heading. And precisely it is the matter of ethics.
Regarding the exercise of assents, as human beings we wish to obtain the correct judgements on everything that happens to us. It is then imperative that we give only our assents to representations (phantasia) that are adequate and objective. We shall not mix up representations with value-judgements, which will inevitably result in one of the four passions. In this case, our logical capability is needed to form the judgement on each representation.
We can sum up our discussion in the following table.
Philosophical discourse
Philosophical
practice
Relationship
Goal
Logic
(la logique)
Assent
(l’assentiment)
Man with himself
Liberated from deception and rashness in judgement
Ethics
(l’éthique)
Impulses
(les tendances)
Man with another man
Acting according to order, to reason, and not carelessly
Physics
(la physique)
Desires and aversions
(le désir et l’aversion)
Man with the universe
Getting what one desires and avoiding what one does not desire
Critical remarks
Stoic philosophers, particularly Epictetus, have offered us a model of philosophical education that put an emphasis on both learning theories and putting them into practice. The goal of this education is to transform one’s life in order to as close as possible reach the level of the Sage, i.e. those who have gained full wisdom. All of the Stoic teachings have been formed in a solid and systematic foundation where every single part is remarkably connected with the other. It is then of little wonder that quite a few philosophers succeeding Stoicism throughout history have expressed their admiration as well as objection to this philosophical system.
In the context of the twenty first century, I can see the benefits that people may reap from doing philosophy in the Stoic way. The complexity and interconnectivity of today’s society has resulted in the massive number of goods, services and information. People are put in front of endless advertisements and offers, which are all not dependent on them. It is not unusual then to see some of them succumb to their own passions deriving from false judgements. Fear, regret, lust and obsession are among the states of mind permeating the atmosphere of today’s civilisation—herein lies the ever-increasing importance of self-control, which can be carried out, among others, in the Stoic way.
The only thing that may hamper me from adopting ideas of Stoicism entirely is its lack of altruism, the fact of caring about the needs and happiness of other people more than our own. Using the Stoic perspective, it seems that at the end of the day every action we do to others will be always intended for the sake of our own interest, i.e. for the conformability of our hēgemonikon to the Nature. Moreover, seeing the events in which people are suffering from injustice as something indifferent is simply unacceptable to me. I would argue that sympathy with others is equally natural to human beings and thus cannot be ignored for the sake of my apathy.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Arrien. 1862. Les Entretiens d’Epictète recueillis par Arrien, translated by V. Courdaveaux. Paris: Librairie Académique Didier et Cie.
Arrien. 1899. Manuel d’Epictète, translated by Jean-François Thurot. Available at http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Manuel_d%E2%80%99%C3%89pict%C3%A8te.
Epictetus. 1890. The Discourses, translated by George Long. Available at http://www.constitution.org/rom/epicdisc.htm.
Epictetus. 1983. The Handbook of Epictetus, translated by Nicholas White. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Secondary Sources
Graver, Margaret, ‘Epictetus’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/ entries/epictetus/.
Hadot, Pierre. 1987. Exercices Spirituels et Philosophie Antique. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
----------. 1999. Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, translated by Michael Chase. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Seddon, Keith H. ‘Epictetus’. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Last updated on 11 July 2005.http://www.iep.utm.edu/epictetu/.
Sellars, John. 2010. Stoicism. Durham: Acumen Publishing Ltd.
Wibowo, A. Setyo. ‘Garis Besar Sistem Filsafat Stoisisme’. Lecture delivered at Driyarakara School of Philosophy on 5 March 2012.
----------. ‘Stoikisme: Keutamaan melalui Askesis’. Lecture delivered at Salihara on 12 May 2012.
- This section was compiled from Margaret Graver (2009) and Keith H. Seddon (2005).
- John Sellars (2010), p. 35.
- Ibid., p. 49.
- Pierre Hadot (1999), p. 191.
- Sellars, op. cit., p. 106.
- Ibid., p. 104.
- Hadot, op. cit., p. 192.
- I am inclined then to hold that philosophy in its truest sense according to the Stoics, especially Epictetus, is more a matter of practice, rather than a matter of discourse. To what extent this notion is true or false, I have yet to find out.
- Hadot, op. cit.
- Sellars, pp. 42–43.
- Ibid., p. 52.
- Hadot, op. cit., p. 193.
- Hadot (1987), p. 136.
- Cf. Hadot (1999), p. 193.
