Status quo (finite)
Wager against God
Infinite punishment (-∞)
Status quo (finite)
Arguments for Pascal’s Wager
The table testifies to the argument from superdominance, which concludes that whether God is or he is not, wagering for God always leads to a result that is better than or at least the same as wagering against God. Alan Hájek (2011) puts it:
‘Wagering for God superdominates wagering against God: the worst outcome associated with wagering for God (status quo) is at least as good as the best outcome associated with wagering against God (status quo); and if God exists, the result of wagering for God is strictly better that the result of wagering against God. [...] Pascal draws the conclusion at this point that rationality requires you to wager for God.’
It should be noticed that this argument requires that the decision be made under uncertainty, which means that ‘the agent does not assign subjective probabilities to the states of the world’ (Hájek, 2011).
If such decision is made under risk, i.e. the agent does assign subjective probabilities, one will deal with the argument from expectations. Under this argument, ‘the expected utility of an outcome is the utility that is assigned to its occurrence, multiplied by the probability of its occurrence’.[6] Accordingly, the preference for wagering for God remains the same because its expected utility is still larger than wagering against God. Suppose that there is a 50:50 chance that God exists and figure 1 denotes the finite value of status quo.[7] The expectation of each wage will be:
wagering for God = ½(+∞) + ½(1) = +∞
wagering against God = ½(-∞) + ½(1) = -∞
As long as God’s existence has a finite probability (e.g. ½, ¼, or else), its expected utility will always be positively infinite and thus overtake other outcomes, even if the probability assigned to it is very small—this is what is called the argument from dominating expectations. Hence it is rational to believe in God.
Apart from the perspective of decision theory, Pascal’s Wager can be supported on grounds of pragmatism. American psychologist and philosopher William James (1842-1910) in his 1897 lecture “The Will to Believe” argues that the utility of the resulting states of mind can determine what one believes. Therefore, believing in God is legitimate because it has beneficial effects on the believer, regardless of the evidence given to them.[8]
Arguments against Pascal’s Wager
Throughout history, quite a few philosophers have objected to this particular notion of Pascal. For instance, Voltaire (1694-1778) remarked on it:
‘It is a very false assertion, that the not laying a wager that God exists, is laying that he does not exist: for certainly that man whose mind is in a state of doubt, and is desirous of being informed, assuredly does not lay on either side; moreover this article is really indecent and childish: the idea of gaming, of losing and winning, is quite unsuitable to the dignity of the subject: farther, the interest I have to believe a thing is no proof that such a thing exists.’ (Voltaire, 1763)
« Il est évidemment faux de dire: Ne point parier que Dieu est, c’est parier qu’il n’est pas; car celui qui doute et demande à s’éclaircir ne parie assurément ni pour ni contre. D’ailleurs, cet article parait un peu indécent et puéril; cette idée de jeu, de perte et de gain, ne convient point à la gravité du sujet; de plus l’intérêt que j’ai à croire une chose n’est pas une preuve de l’existence de cette chose. »
(Voltaire, 1728)
However, Voltaire seems to have mistakenly believed that Pascal wanted to prove the existence of God by the Wager argument—he did not. Further, by rejecting all the idea of wagering since the beginning, Voltaire did not actually contribute to the arguments against the wager (Hájek, 2011).
Putting aside the meticulous calculation of probability and the decision theory, I would like to take a more existentialist point of view. First, can doubtful people be persuaded to whole-heartedly believe in God only with this argument? Does a decision to believe automatically lead to the will to believe? Paul Saka (2005) proposes an interesting illustration: ‘If I offered to pay you $1000 for believing the sky is green, for instance, could you sincerely adopt this belief simply by wishing to?’ It is obvious then that belief is not merely a matter of deliberate decision, but rather of heart, of will.[9] Did Pascal himself not write that ‘the heart has its reasons, which reason does not know’ (Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connoît point)?
Second, Pascal did not take into account the many possibilities of the nature of God. Since he asserted that no one knew of the nature of God, is it impossible that there existed a God who favours genuineness and strongly disapproves of insincerity? Which of these two persons would God reward with infinite bliss: an atheist who, out of his self-awareness, leads a morally good life without even thinking of God, or a religious fanatic who believes in God lest he is not condemned to eternal punishment?
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Pascal, Blaise. Pensées de Pascal sur la religion et sur quelques autres sujets. Paris: Garnier Frères (first published in 1866).
Pascal, Blaise. Pensées, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer. London: Penguin Books, 1970 (first published in 1966).
Secondary Sources
Blackburn, Simon. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 (second edition revised).
Desprez, Guillaume (ed.). Pensées de M. Pascal sur la religion et sur quelques autres sujets, qui ont esté trouvées après sa mort parmy ses papiers, Édition de Port-Royal, second edition, 1670 (modernised orthography). http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Pens%C3%A9es/%C3%89dition_de_Port-Royal.
Hájek, Alan. ‘Pascal’s Wager’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/pascal-wager/ (last modified on 17 June 2011).
Hardiman, F. Budi. Filsafat Modern: Dari Machiavelli sampai Nietzsche. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2004.
Saka, Paul. ‘Pascal’s Wager about God’, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/pasc-wag/ (last modified on 20 April 2005).
Voltaire. ‘Remarques (Premières) sur les Pensées de Pascal (1728)’. L’Association Voltaire Intégral. http://www.voltaire-integral.com/Html/22/07_Pascal.html
Voltaire. The Works of M. de Voltaire with Notes, Historical and Critical, Vol. XXVI, trans. Tobias George Smollett and Thomas Francklin. London: 1763. http://books.google.co.id/books?id=JDcLAAAAQAAJ.
[1] Simon Blackburn (2006), p. 268.
[2] A.J. Krailsheimer (EP:27) wrote, ‘A translator of Pascal must pick one edition and stick to it; he will only make confusion worse confounded by introducing editorial variants of his own. At present there are more than half a dozen different arrangements of the Pensées on sale, and the number is not likely to diminish. So many different numberings exist that checking one version against another has become an intolerable chore, and none commands universal assent.’
