RECENT showdown in South China Sea between Indonesian Navy and China’s Coast Guard has reinvigorated public interest towards the region. Some applauded Indonesia’s resolve in defending her rightful maritime territory. However, some are still left wondering over China’s motives in provoking such regional conflict – including with VietNam, Malaysia, and Philippines. How can one explain why China risks a major war that could potentially drag the U.S. in for bunch of uninhabited rocks?
Some say they are fighting for the control over major oil and gas reserve in those seas. But this seems not to be the case. After all, great-powers rarely (if any) fight one another in a major war over economic resources throughout modern history. Or is it because China’s nine-dash line? For sure, one needs to differentiate the means, ways, and ends of phenomena. Nine-dash line is a mean that China uses to justify its policy. But it does not explain the end-game it wants to achieve – therefore, it cannot be used to explain its motives in South China Sea.
LET’S take a look back into 20th century, shall we. World War I started when Austria-Hungary declared war and attacked Serbia. So, does it mean that World War I was caused by Austria-Hungary’s invasion? No. Austria-Hungary did start the war, but it certainly not caused it. The cause of the war was great-powers’ concern among the prevalent regional order in Europe – and their wish to alter it.
The Germans (together with Austro-Hungarian) uncomfortably looked at the shifting of balance of power towards the French-Russian (and British possibly, but not definitively) alliance. They saw the erosion of Germany’s dominance over European order (which it achieved since 1871) while looking for a way to reverse the trend. The French and Russian, boosted with its newly gained power – and had been humiliated during Germans’ led order before – were also looking for a way to punish Germany – and her allied.
As with World War I, World War II did start with an invasion. It started when Hitler invaded Poland. However, Poland was not the cause of the Anglo-French and German rivalry – that will escalate to a war in 1939. Instead, the Anglo-French were concerned over the shifting balance of power towards German’s favor and sought to prevent it from going further in that direction. That determination finally leads to war over Poland’s survival.
Put it simply, what Serbia, Poland, and South China Sea (and East China Sea) shares in common is that they become the venue of great powers rivalry. While being so, they definitely not the cause of that rivalry.
UNDERSTANDING the cause of current Sino-American rivalry, one needs to see the history and strategic picture of Asia region. Put it simply, one needs to see beyond South China Sea. Following the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II, the U.S. is the sole great-power that can project its power throughout the region. Since that day, the region has come under American-led regional order. Having only a fraction of U.S.’ power, other states in the region accepted American primacy.
What is happening today is that China has gathered enough power and becoming powerful enough to match (or even surpass) U.S.’ ability to project power throughout much of Asia. Power (hard-power) means leadership throughout the history and with its newly gained power, China wants a bigger role in the regional leadership. For sure, though seems weird for most people, anyone who carefully study history will concede that this is a normal through arguably regrettable state behavior.
One might point finger towards Japan and Germany as comparisons – which both rise of power in recent times does not corresponds with a regional crisis that risks regional war – and, therefore, accused China’s behavior as not normal. However, history once again shows that both states are the anomaly – not China.
As charismatic Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, “Unlike other emergent countries, China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West.” It is clear from his observation that China sets its sight to displace the U.S. as the dominant power that will dictate the regional order in Asia region.
This is not to say that we must agree with and/or accept all China want to do. We may dislike how our rival thinks and behave, but we have to understand them. Without understanding how China thinks, a plausible solution to current conflict will be hard to devise.
CHINA’S aspiration for greater regional leadership is unfortunately met with fierce challenge from the U.S. as well as other regional great-powers (Japan and India). Following the rise of China’s assertiveness, the U.S. introduced pivot (later rebranded as rebalancing) while her ally, Japan, has reinterpreted her constitution so that allowing Tokyo to be more active both politically and militarily abroad. India, for her part, introduced look east policy while trying to strengthen her maritime power to prevent Chinese incursion into Indian Ocean.
Facing the prospect of containment (instead of accommodation), the question of paramount importance for China’s leaders is: how can China displace the U.S (and therefore, U.S led regional order) from Asia?
China seems to believe that the U.S.-led regional order is based on U.S.-led political-security regional order. This political-security order in turn is based on the U.S. regional alliance system which is known as hub-and-spoke system and encompassing Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand. This alliance system grants the U.S. access to forward bases that ensures her ability to rapidly project her power throughout the region whenever crisis erupts.
Without such bases, the U.S. won’t be able to effectively projecting forces and, therefore, will have only marginal influence in a crisis. Thus, curtailing U.S. capability to respond to a regional crisis means much less U.S.’ influence upon regional order.
So, as the logic goes, breaking this alliance system will lead to a breaking up of the U.S.-led regional order. Thus, the question now moved toward: how can China break up U.S.’ alliance system?
Alliance, by its nature, means an insurant. By inking an alliance, the U.S. has insured her allies that she will help defending them in times of crisis. Just as how commercial insurance company works, the success of the ‘business’ rested on the insurer’s credibility. As long as U.S.’ allies believe that Washington will fulfill her words, the alliance system will hold up. However, if U.S.’ allies do not believe in her words – thereby doubting the credibility of her words, the alliance system will unravel.
New question emerge as the consequence: how can China damage U.S.’ credibility so much that it will lead to unraveling of its regional alliance system?
For sure, there is no better way to damage one’s credibility than proving that one is unable to fulfill its words. Put it another way, China must shows U.S.’ allies that the U.S. will not come by their side when they needed her. That means instigating a conflict with U.S.’ allies, making sure they will call for U.S.’ assistance, and, at the same time, making sure that the U.S. will not fulfill her insurant.
It is a dangerous game to play for sure. Beijing must do its best to make sure the U.S. will not come by her allies side or else it will face a war with the U.S. – a grim possibility given both sides possession of nuclear weapons.
In order to succeed, China must be pretty sure that conflict she is instigating is important enough for U.S.’ allies so that they will call for U.S.’ assistance, but that the conflict per se is not important enough from U.S.’ perspective so that making it highly unlikely for her to fulfill her insurance. Put it simply, China must make sure that the conflict per se represents high-stakes from U.S. allies’ perspectives while a negligible one from U.S.’ perspective.
Bunch of uninhabited rocks in South China Sea (and East China Sea) will do just fine. It is a matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity – which can hardly be compromised – from the perspective of U.S. allies. While from U.S.’ perspective, those rocks represent no more than what they are; that are rocks. Those rocks have little strategic value and, thus, in themselves have little relevance for U.S.’ national interests.
ENTERING the fourth year of China’s surge of assertiveness, it seems that China’s strategy has achieved some success. In South China Sea, U.S.’ responses are both lackluster while showing degree of indecisiveness. Arguably, the most infamous among those is U.S.’ failure to properly assist Philippines in protecting its sovereignty in Scarborough Shoal. However, responding such crisis with more resolve entails more risks. For sure, lower-risks option is available in the form of accommodating China’s aspiration by trying to develop some form of joint leadership in Asia region. While it is not too late for the U.S. to reverse the negative trend, she surely has much to do. Written by: Zidny Ilman. Zidny Ilman is the Coordinator of Indonesia Berbicara's Study Center (Pusat Kajian).
