In addition to the differentiation between exercising in theory (la Logique; ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας, epi tēs theōrias) and exercising in the matters of life (la pratique; ἐπὶ τῶν βιωτικῶν, epi tōn biōtikōn), Epictetus asserted that the former is easier to do than the latter. Therefore, one should start with the former and tackle the latter upon completion of the former.
What, then, does one learn at the first stage of philosophical education? It is popularly known that Stoicism sees philosophy as that which comprises three parts: logic, physics and ethics. Put it briefly, Stoic logic examines the way we gain knowledge, or epistemology, which consists of three stages: (1) representation (phantasia), (2) assent (sunkatathesis) to adequate representation (katalēptikē), and (3) comprehension (katalēpsis). Stoic physics covers a wide range of topics, including ontology, cosmology and psychology; but for our purposes, suffice it to say that ‘the close kinship between particular human beings and the cosmos as a whole’[5] leads to a belief that one can but wholeheartedly submit himself or herself to the active universal principle, Divine Providence. No one can be separated from this active principle because human soul (pneuma) and body are simply part of the cosmic soul and body.[6] Realising this interrelation, Stoic ethics teaches one how to behave in order to be the Sage, those who have reached apatheia or ataraxia, no longer disturbed by any external thing.
Some people might then be inclined to hold that logic and physics constitute the theoretical-discursive part as the study of the rules of discourse and the study of nature, respectively; while ethics, on the other hand, exclusively belongs to the practical stage. Such notion is considered incorrect by Pierre Hadot. He asserted that ‘both theoretical philosophical discourse and philosophy itself as it was lived and experienced were made up of three constituent parts’[7]. What Hadot wanted to say is that we cannot exclude ethics from the theoretical stage of philosophy—which Hadot referred to as ‘philosophical discourse’—, and so is it false to say that logic and physics are not taken into account at the practical stage of philosophy—which Hadot referred to as ‘philosophy itself’.[8]
To make things clear, we ought to find out: How is the relationship between these two stages?
On the one hand, each stage appears to be distinct from the other. In the theoretical stage, Hadot argued, the three parts of philosophy—logic, physics and ethics—were clearly differentiated, external from one another, because they had their own objects of explanations and developed in accordance with a logical succession; while in the practical stage one acts in an integrated fashion, which includes the three parts of philosophy (which we will discuss later) altogether without losing the unity of the exercise.
‘On this level [of philosophical practice], we are no longer concerned with theoretical logical—that is, the theory of correct reasoning—rather, we are concerned not to let ourselves be deceived in our everyday lives by false representations. We are no longer concerned with theoretical physics—the theory of the origin and evolution of the cosmos—we are concerned with being aware at every instant that we are parts of the cosmos, and that we must make our desires conform to this situation. We no longer do ethical theory—the definition and classification of virtues and duties—we simply act in an ethical way.’[9]
On the other hand, the two stages cannot be separated as if they were entirely independent from one another. The two stages are interrelated. Learning only philosophical discourse without putting it into practice is simply as futile as practising philosophy without having a strong theoretical foundation in mind; neither way will lead one to the Sage.
The same interrelation applies between the three parts of each stage: logic-ethics-physics in the theoretical stage, and the three areas (topoi) of philosophy in the practical stage. The unity of logic-ethics-physics was likened by different Stoics, Diogenes Laertius wrote, to an animal (which comprises bones and sinews, flesh and the soul) or an egg (which comprises eggshell, white and yolk).[10]
Meanwhile, the importance of recognising all topoi of philosophy is also confirmed by Epictetus in the Handbook. If one does not begin with practising theories and instead focuses only on expressing the theories in words, he or she would end up in a contradictory situation as in the following quotation:
Handbook, chapter 52
Manuel, chapitre LII
The first and most necessary aspect [τόπος] of philosophy is that of dealing with philosophical propositions, such as “not to hold to falsehood.” The second is that of demonstrations, for example, “Must one not hold to falsehood?” The third is that of the confirmation and articulation of these, for example, “Why is this a demonstration? What is demonstration? What is entailment? What is conflict? What is truth? What is falsity?”
Therefore the third is necessary because of the second, and the second because of the first; but the most necessary, and the one where one must rest, is the first. We, however, do it backwards, since we spend time in the third and all of our effort goes into it, and we neglect the first completely. Therefore we hold to falsehood, but we are ready to explain how it is demonstrated that one must not hold to falsehood.
La première partie de la philosophie et la plus essentielle, c’est de mettre en pratique les maximes, par exemple de ne pas mentir ; la seconde, ce sont les démonstrations, par exemple, d’où vient qu’il ne faut pas mentir ; la troisième est celle qui confirme et éclaircit les démonstrations elles-mêmes ; par exemple d’où vient que c’est une démonstration ? Qu’est-ce-qu’une démonstration ? Qu’est-ce que conséquence, incompatibilité, vrai, faux ?
Ainsi donc, la troisième partie est nécessaire à cause de la seconde, et la seconde à cause de la première ; mais la plus nécessaire, celle au delà de laquelle on ne peut plus remonter, c’est la première. Nous, nous agissons au rebours. Nous nous arrêtons à la troisième partie ; toute notre étude est pour elle, et nous négligeons complètement la première. Aussi nous mentons, mais nous savons sur le bout du doigt comment on démontre qu’il ne faut pas mentir.
All in all, the Stoic system, whether between the stages or between the parts of each stage, is highly interrelated that ‘no one part can be adequately understood without at least some grasp of the central concepts developed in the other parts’.[11]
Askesis as the practical stage of philosophy
We have seen that studying philosophical theories is not the same as putting them into practice, even though both can be impossibly separated from each other. This section then will discuss the more difficult stage of philosophy: the practical stage, which takes place in quotidian life. To begin with, Epictetus utilised the traditional distinction between things that depend on us and things that do not.
Handbook, chapter 1
Entretiens, chapitre I
Some things are up to us and some are not up to us. Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, aversions—in short, whatever is our own doing. Our bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our reputations, or our public offices, or, that is, whatever is not our own doing. The things that are up to us are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; the things that are not up to us are weak, enslaved, hindered, not our own.
Des choses les unes dépendent de nous, les autres ne dépendent pas de nous. Ce qui dépend de nous, ce sont nos jugements, nos tendances, nos désirs, nos aversions, en un mot tout ce qui est opération de notre âme ; ce qui ne dépend pas de nous, c’est le corps, la fortune, les témoignages de considération, les charges publiques, en un mot tout ce qui n’est pas opération de notre âme. Ce qui dépend de nous est, de sa nature, libre, sans empêchement, sans contrariété ; ce qui ne dépend pas de nous est inconsistant, esclave, sujet à empêchement, étranger.
1.The things that depend on us (ce qui dépend de nous; ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, eph’ hēmin) are whatever is our own doing (ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα, osa hēmetera erga), or, in other words, the acts of our own soul (ce qui est opération de notre âme).
2.The things that do not depend on us (ce qui ne dépend pas de nous; οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ouk eph’ hēmin) are whatever is not our own doing (οὐχ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα, ouch osa hēmetera erga), or, in other words, that which is not the acts of our own soul (ce qui n’est pas opération de notre âme).
We are only able to take control of things that depend on us; we are free to choose any of them. Conversely, about the things that do not depend on us, we can do nothing; those things depend instead ‘on the general course of nature and fate’.[12] This is, again, what philosophy promises (cf. Discourses I, 15); it does not pretend to change the external things, which are not up to us.
Cognisant of the distinction, we have to simply zero in on the things that depend on us. And so does the practical stage of philosophy lay its exercise (askesis) on them. According to Epictetus, there are three areas (topoi) that should be taken into account as the objects of philosophical exercise. The following passages clearly indicate them.
