Why Indonesia Missing to Achieve a Miracle?: A Comparative Study Indonesia-South Korea Economic Development during Indonesia's New Order Regime

1. Indonesia's Achievements are Remarkable but still Lagging behind Korea

Indonesia began to enter the post-independence significant development period when President Suharto came to power and known as the New Order regime. After the bloody tragedy in 1965 in Indonesia, President Sukarno's power began to wane and practically passed into the hands of General Suharto through the President Order in March 1966 which known as Supersemar (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret). In 1967, Suharto was appointed acting president and confirmed as Indonesia's second president a year later by the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) as a highest institution in Indonesia at the time. The New Order was in power for more than three decades since General Suharto gained power in 1966 until his stepdown from presidency in 1998.

The achievements of the development of the new order are remarkable. Following a period of hyperinflation and economic downturn in the late 1960s under President Sukarno, Indonesia underwent a substantial and continuous economic expansion for 30 years under the leadership of President Suharto. Through the restoration of monetary stability and the rehabilitation of the deteriorated productive apparatus and infrastructure, the Indonesian economy witnessed an unprecedented rapid and sustained growth (Wie, 2007).

As a results, Indonesia since the early 1970s has been achieved rapid progress as shown in the Table 1. GDP national climbed significantly almost 40 folds in 30 years from USD 5.67 billion to USD 217.75 billion as well as GDP per capita increased more than 13 times in 27 years. Meanwhile, inflation rate fell drastically from almost 600% in 1965 to 4.31% in 1985 followed by poverty rate steadily drop from 60% in 1970 to 17.47% in 1997. Furthermore, gross enrolment ratio in secondary education was rose from 18.2% in 1970 to 54.4% in 27 years later.

Table 1. Indonesia's Socio-Economic Achievements during the New Order Regime

Indicator

Year

1965

1970

1985

1997

GDP per capita (US$)*

n/a

79.4

514.4

1.054

GDP*

5.67 bio (1967)

9.15 bio

85.29 bio

217.75 bio

Inflation rate (%)****

594

8.8

4.31

11.10

Poverty rate (%) ***

n/a

60

21.6

17.47

Unemployment rate 

(%) **

n/a

n/a

2.2

4.8

Value exports 

(% of GDP) *

32.22

13.69

22.51

25.04

Share of agriculture 

(% of GDP)*

n/a

n/a

23.77

16.09

Share of manufact. 

(% of GDP) *

n/a

45

16.4

26.8

Share of trade 

(% of GDP) *

11.01

28.68

44.72

55.99

Government spending 

(% of GDP) **

10.68

13.80

20.17

18.30

Gross enrolment ratio in secondary education 

(%) *

n/a

18.2

34.3

54.4

Source:

*World Bank

** IMF

*** Indonesian Statistic Central Agency (BPS)

**** Bank of Indonesia (BI)

Even though Indonesia's economic performance during the New Order is impressive but if compared with South Korea this was not miraculous enough. Korea's achievements are widely recognized as a miracle (Lucas, 1993). Since the inception of the initial nationwide economic plan in 1962, the Korean government has consistently prioritized economic growth above all other national agendas. Based on export-oriented economic development strategy, Korea has attained notable economic success. South Korea joined the OECD in 1996, and in 2021, the UNCTAD designated Korea as a developed country. This marks the first instance of the UNCTAD making an upward classification since its establishment in 1964 (Ko, 2022).

However, Indonesia and Korea have a similar GDP around USD 9 billion until 1970 as shown Table 2, starting from 1970s, the gap of GDP between both countries was widening. GDP per capita of Korea has exploded since the mid of the 1970s (Wardhana, 2016). The value increases dramatically from hundred dollars in 1965 to more than USD 10,000 in the 1990s. During development era, South Korea experienced an authoritarian system with a development state model (Yoon, 2019) as well as Indonesia but with different results (Winanti, 2002).

Table 2. Indonesia-South Korea Economic Comparison in 1965 -- 1997

Indicator

Year

1965

1970

1985

1997

RoI

RoK

RoI

RoK

RoI

RoK

RoI

RoK

GDP (US$) *

5.67 bio

(1967)

4.86 bio (1967)

9.15 bio

9.01 bio

85.29 bio

101.3 bio

217.75 bio

569.75

GDP per capita (US$)*

n/a

109

79.4

279

514.4

2,482

1,054

12,398

GDP growth (%)*

1.08

7.31

7.53

10.05

2.46

7.83

4.7

6.17

Poverty rate (%)

n/a

40.9

*

60

**

23.4

*

21.6

**

18.50

*

17.47

**

7.67

*

Source:

*World Bank

** Indonesian Statistic Central Agency (BPS)

2. A Research Question

From the background above, a question then arises: "Why did the development era in Indonesia's New Order regime fail to achieve miracles like South Korea?" This paper will examine that important question. However, this question and research on this topic was not new. At least there are three primary publications about this topic. First, there are book wrote by one of the prominent Indonesian social scholars, Arief Budiman (1991), with the original title is "Negara dan Pembangunan: Studi tentang Indonesia dan Korea Selatan". This book discussed the political economy of development in both countries, provides an overview the comparative development performance, the role of the colonial legacy, international politics and geo-politics in the development of both countries.

Second, a master thesis from KDI School of Public Policy and Management in 2002 by Poppy Sulistyaning Winanti. The title of this thesis is "A Comparative Political Economy of Development of Korea and Indonesia: Historical-Structuralists Explanation", and an extent of Arief Budiman's book particularly from the historical and structuralist approach. The last one is an article with the title is "Political Economy Determinants of Growth Acceleration: A Korea-Indonesia Comparative Study". This article was published in a journal managed by Indonesian Finance Ministry in 2016, explains utilizing the most similar systems acceleration and the aggregate economic growth in Korea and Indonesia through the several approaches such as the initial conditions, colonial legacy, and external resources. Therefore, this paper will be answering the question from different approach and theory.

3. Fundamental Causes of Economic Growth: Institutions Hypothesis

This paper constitutes comparative research. As Ragin points out, quoted by Stark and Roberts (1998), comparative research can be defined as one that compared large social units, nations, societies, states, cities, or countries. According Stark and Roberts, there are two types of comparative research: the case-oriented approach and the variable-oriented approach. The variable-oriented approach tests the hypothesis by applying statistical techniques such as correlation and regression to variables based on an appropriate set of aggregate case. Meanwhile, the case-oriented approach selects two or more cases and examines them closely to explain some striking difference or differences between (or among) them.

The primary difference between comparative research and other social research methods, like survey and experiment lies in how obtain data. While other methods can collect data through experiment, interview, questionnaire, or observation, comparative research primarily obtains data through documents or library research (Winanti, 2002). Hence, this paper is comparative research, based on the case-oriented approach. Its primary source is in English and Indonesian languages.

For case analyzing, this paper will use the theory developed by Daron Acemoglu to determine the factors that influence a country's economic growth. According to Acemoglu (2009), there are four fundamental causes of economic growth consists of the luck factor, the geography, the culture, and the institutions factor. While all four factors are complementary, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), demonstrates that the primary driver behind the reversal of economic fortunes among former European colonies over the past 500 years was the influence of European colonialism on economic institutions. For understanding the fundamental causes of Indonesian economic growth to obtain generalizable lessons from Indonesian experience and comparison with South Korea experience, we will focus on the institutions or economic institutions factor.

Economic institutions refer to Acemoglu are encompasses different of social arrangements, rules, regulations, laws, and policies that affect economic incentives and thus the incentives to invest in technology, physical capital, and human capital. Specifically, Park (2011) defines government institutions as the policies, regulations, and organizations of the government that are devised mainly to have a proactive role in resource allocations among individual and firms. In the other words, both market institutions and government institutions are considered to be the main coordination institutions in any economy. In accordance with that, Acemoglu have classified the economic institutions into three categories as property right institutions, contracting institutions, and coordination institutions.

To explain of these three institutions, this paper will refer to Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) and Acemoglu (2009) definitions. Property right institutions refer to the rules and regulations that protect individuals and their property against expropriation by the government and powerful elites. Property right institutions ensure that individual have the incentive to invest and improve their property, as they can reap benefits and enjoy the security of ownership. Strong property rights institutions are essential for promoting economic growth, investment, and financial development, as the provide a stable and predictable environment for individuals to engage in economic activities. The measuring tool for property right institutions in this paper is the constraint on the executive score and democracy index by Polite 5, and the political regime index by V-Dem Institute.

Meanwhile, contracting institutions refer to the rules, regulations, and legal framework that govern the enforcement of contracts between individuals and businesses. While property right institutions regulate vertical relationships, contracting institutions regulate horizontal relationships in society and play a role in facilitating economic transactions and financial intermediation. Several measurements can be used for these institutions such as the Index of Legal Formalism and Ease of Doing Business Index by the World Bank. But due to lack of data about Indonesia at the time in those indices, this paper will describe it from the performance of banking and the stock market in Indonesia.

Coordination institutions themselves are instrumental in enabling economic transactions and financial intermediation by regulate financial market and establishing the necessary rules, mechanisms, and infrastructure for coordination and cooperation. These institutions are responsible for coordinating the actions of individuals, firms, and other economic agents to ensure smooth and efficient interactions. To see these institutions, this paper will analyze whether the Indonesian government or market institutions succeeds in playing its role as coordination institutions or not, as Park (2011) sees the same role for the Korean government through the concept of "Korea Inc".

In terms of the period, this paper will examine the governance of the New Order in Indonesia from 1966 to 1998 and, for South Korea, the years 1961 to 1987. This particular timeframe was selected due to its widespread recognition as an era marked by significant development and the establishment of robust economic foundations for each country (especially during the presidency of Park Chung-hee in South Korea), resulting in impressive achievements. Conversely, it is noteworthy that this period also witnessed the presence of similar authoritarian regimes in power in both countries.

4. Indonesia's New Order Economic Institutions Performance

In the mid 1960s, Indonesia was facing economic chaos, experiencing stagnating output, widespread poverty and hunger, crumbling infrastructure, and a hyperinflation of almost 600% because of runaway deficit-financing (Wie, 2012). Following the political turmoil in 1965-1966, there is power shifting from President Sukarno to President Suharto. Then, the New Order regime emerged from a coalition of political and social forces, at the core of this coalition was the army leadership, but many intellectuals, businesspeople and anti-communist political groups also supported. Seeing their first goal as being the elimination of the communist party and its supporters, Suharto and his supporters then set about stabilizing the economic situation and undermining other potential political challengers (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010).

As explained before, Indonesia's economic development during the New Order era was impressive when compared to the 20 years the Old Order was in power before. Following the restoration of monetary stability by the New Order government, which successfully addressed hyperinflation and rehabilitated the deteriorated productive apparatus and infrastructure, the Indonesian economy witnessed an unparalleled period of rapid and sustained growth from the late 1960s onwards, lasting for the subsequent three decades. Indonesia's rapid economic growth during the New Order was accompanied by rapid social development, as reflected by a steady decline in absolute poverty, steady growth in private consumption per capita, steady rise in life expectancy at birth, and steady decline in the adult illiteracy rate (Wie, 2007).

a. Poor Property Right Institutions          

The New Order remarkable achievements in fact are not support by adequate property right institutions. This situation has a similarity with South Korea during the development era in 1960s to 1980s, since property right institutions did not play a significant role in Korea's economic development measured from Polity IV data set (Park, 2011). The Polity uses numeric values ranging from 7 for a subordinated or on-par executive, to 1 if executive is unconstrained. Refer to Constraints on the Executive Score by Polity 5 (2021), Indonesia only gains score 2 during 30 years from 1967 -- 1997.

Between Indonesia and South Korea at the developmental time indeed was categorized are authoritarian state. Indonesian political system under the New Order was authoritarian military-based regime, which was characterized by a central power on Suharto's hand. Robison (1986) argues that the feature of the New Order regime has been the entrenchment and centralization of the authoritarian rule by military, the appropriation of the state by its officials, and the exclusion of political parties from effective participation in the decision-making process.

Assessment from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (2023) shown the Indonesia's political score is extremely low (score 0) in 1966 -- 1970, and still poor (score 1) during 1971 -- 1998, the same score with South Korea during 1963 -- 1987 period. The V-Dem's classification distinguishes between closed autocracies (score 0), electoral autocracies (score 2), and liberal democracies (score 3). The alteration in Indonesia's score in 1971 can be attributed to the occurrence of a general election, marking the first election in the New Order era. Clearly, from those indicators between Indonesia and South Korea have a poor property right institutions during developmental period.

 b. Fragile Contracting Institutions

Indonesia has a long history of banking and capital market from the late 19th century under the Dutch colonization. In 1965, there are 7 government-owned nationwide banks in Indonesia own, including bank that served specifically for farmer and fisherman cooperatives. Throughout the 1950-1970 period, several financial institutions were established by the Regional Government. Apart from that, the government is also encouraging the establishment of market banks to provide financial services to market traders. In the late 1980s, these Market Banks were then confirmed as rural banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat) which still exist today (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2019).

Non-banking industries as contracting institutions also have been widely known by the Indonesian people since pre-independence era, such as cooperative institutions and formal pawnshops agency. Meanwhile, until early 1990s, rural Korean in particular depended on informal financial institutions instead of banks or other financial entities. The prevalence of small, informal financial setups, coupled with a notably low household savings ratio in the 1960s, points to inadequate contractual institutions in South Korea (Park S. , 2011). From this perspective, Indonesia in the early stages of development at least had more established contracting institutions than South Korea.

Furthermore, the issuance of the deregulation package in 1988 (Paket Kebijaksanaan Oktober 1988 -- Pakto 88), has led to emergence of several small and medium scale commercial banks. In the end, the number of commercial bank in Indonesia swelled from 111 banks in October 1988 to 240 banks in 1994 -- 1995, while the number of Rural Banks increased drastically from 8,041 in 1988 to 9,310 banks in 1996, before finally dropped during the financial crisis of 1997 -- 1998 (Izza, 2018)

Besides of bank and non-bank industries, Indonesia opened its capital market after independence in 1952 (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2016), while South Korea opened in 1956 (Park, Kim, & Park, 2021). However, like South Korea, the development of the Indonesian capital market experienced a sluggishness for several decades after it opened. It was only after the government carried out deregulation in the early 1987 period that enthusiasm in the capital market increased again. The December 1987 Policy Package (Paket Desember 1987) was a simplification of the requirements for the stock and bond issuance process as well as the elimination of several fess such as securities issuance registration fees. This policy also removed restrictions on share price fluctuations on the stock exchanges. As an option for issuers who do not yet meet the requirements to enter the stock exchange. In 1989, 37 companies were go public and their shares were listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchanges (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2016).

However, this seemingly established contracting institutions has some problems, especially in the banking industry. The World Bank data shows that lending interest rates in Indonesia were relatively high at above 12% during the New Order (World Bank, 2023). Interest rates are no longer determined by market forces, because of the credit mechanism increasingly imperfect with the allocation of credit to individual groups, and bad credit is getting out of control (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2019). These vulnerable contracting institutions were ultimately unable to weather the storm of the Asian financial crisis, which brought Indonesia into a multi-dimensional crisis and led to the collapse of the New Order regime.

c. Ineffective Coordination Institutions

The government's role as a coordination institutions during development is the key to South Korea's success in achieving miracles (Park, 2011). The primary reasons behind the economic progress in Korea lie in the government's efforts to address institutional shortcomings. These efforts aimed to create favorable conditions for positive feedback loops between export-driven economic expansion, marked by substantial investments, and the enhanced accumulation of human capital through the more efficient utilization of previously unused labor. The Korean government opted for export-oriented industries to catalyze lasting economic growth, actively resorting to foreign borrowing to fund specific sectors and businesses. As a result, its function can be described as the central authority of "Korea, Inc.," employing a command-and-control system along with discretionary actions.

From the perspective of this coordinating institutions, we can see quite contrasting differences between Indonesia and South Korea. First, strategy for economic growth. While South Korea chose an export-oriented strategy, Indonesia took the opposite strategy an import substitution for first 15 years the New Order era. This strategy emphasized fiscal policy to reduce import and provide a favorable circumstance for the promotion of domestic industry and started to promote the manufacturing industry (Wie, 2012). However, this strategy has a detrimental impact on the national economy due to its protectionist character, which has high costs and causes unemployment in traditional economic sectors (Asryad & Detajanna, 1997).

Second, effective planning board. Both Indonesia and South Korea have had Five Year Plan's (FYPs) during the development period. To ensure development plans run well, Korea has an Economic Planning Board (EPB) that the oversees the implementation of "Korea Inc." blueprint where the President acts like a CEO in a company (Park, 2011).  The President and the EPB, monitored the performance of firms and rewarded or punished them accordingly. Indonesia in a similar way has the National Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Bappenas), which had a very crucial role in designing, defining, and formulating of FYPs.

However, Bappenas policy provided a protective framework for the emergence of domestic capital dominated by state corporations and by companies owned by the military and their domestic Chinese corporate clients (Robison, 1986). Hence, Bappenas does not have enough effective power to ensure that the planning and development implementation process is carried out in accordance with the principles of merit system and good governance. The New Order regime did have several great economists and technocrats known as the Berkely Mafia, but according to Hill and Narjoko (2010), their role was like that of a firefighter. During periods of looming or actual crisis, technocrats were allowed to be in the ascendancy, and they delivered major economic reforms that led to recovery and faster growth. Reversely, during periods of buoyant economic growth, they were less influential.

Third, leadership style. This factor is perhaps the most significant and influential explanation in the context of coordination institutions and Indonesia's economic achievements in general during the New Order era. The key figures in the developmental progress of Korea and Indonesia, President Park Chung-hee and President Suharto, shared a dedication to advancing their countries and attaining substantial economic growth. President Park Chung- hee is known to have a personal commitment to creating an effective and relatively clean government, supported by a competent bureaucracy. Unfortunately, in Indonesia, the opposite happens.

The political leadership commitment to economic development in Indonesia case was only a political jargon and was not followed by the concrete executive action (Winanti, 2002). The New Order regime failed to take full advantages economic opportunities to achieve miracles because of the interests of elites, cronies and the president's family who increasingly control the country's economic resources. Over time, the concentration of authority in the New Order state grew, diminishing societal influence, and resorting to violence to maintain power when necessary. Authoritarianism eventually gave rise to self-serving policies, including the exploitation of natural resources in resource-rich areas for the advantage of the central government and ruling elite (Wie, 2012). Several studies even concluded that the New Order regime changed from a developmentalism-state to a patrimonial and predatory state with rent-seeking bureaucracy.

This ineffective coordinating agency is further exacerbated by the high level of corruption in the government, judiciary, and bureaucratic systems. V-Dem Institute (2023) data shows that Indonesia during the New Order era had e very high political corruption index, above 0.9. Meanwhile South Korea during the authoritarian-development period relatively moderate at 0.6 points.

5. Conclusion 

Indonesia achieved impressive economic growth and progress during the development period of the New Order regime in 1966-1998. However, this achievement is more miraculous that what was achieved by South Korea during the years of development from 1961 to the end of 1980s. From several indicators, Indonesia and South Korea have several similarities when starting the development period, such as being classified as the poorest country in the world, having relatively the same GDP size, and implementing a state-developmentalism model under an authoritarian regime.

The differences in the economic performance of these two countries can be compared using Acemoglu's economic institutions hypothesis consisting of property right institutions, contracting institutions, and coordination institutions. First, both countries have poor property rights institutions, they are not capable enough to be a driving factor for economic achievement. Second, even though Indonesia has a long history of contracting institutions and plays a role in national economic progress, these institutions particularly for banking industries have vulnerabilities that ultimately collapsed during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis which also hit Indonesia.

Third, that main factor that makes Indonesia's economic achievements different from the miracle achieved by South Korea lies in the coordination institutions. South Korea has a government that is an influential coordination institutions, at least as reflected in the leadership of President Park Chung-hee, the functioning of Economic Planning Board and a competent bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Indonesia has an ineffective coordination institutions, where President Suharto could not create a clean government system and competent bureaucracy. As a result, the significant economic benefits were only enjoyed by the elite and President Suharto's cronies. On the other hand, National Planning Agency (Bappenas) also does not have strong enough power to direct development that can achieve better economic advancement.

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* This article was submitted as an assignment for the "Topics in Public Administration and Public Policy" class in the Graduate School of Public Administration (GSPA) at Seoul National University (SNU), December 2023