A Review: From the Theory of Meaning to Inferentialism

An Overview of the Traditional Theory of Meaning

Deep within languages, there emerge meanings that construct apprehension. But how are meanings in the language actually grasped or apprehended? Meanings are defined distinctively by some language philosophers. What makes the languages understood by their speakers is certainly when strings of words uttered or written consist of truth-value, leading to the speaker-hearer's understanding of the falsity and truth of what is being said. Most of them believe this understanding of meaning is purposefully congenial to common sense, which should be connected to facts. This assurance is a claim that the use of logic is pivotal in comprehending meanings. Lycan (2008), in his book, mentions that meanings should not be conceived as if it is one single thing such as singular words as snow, brick, or shoes, wherein a language constructive concept cannot be delved into -- disclaiming Entity theory. Interestingly, meanings can thus be found in linguistic expressions that are notably ambiguous, synonymous, or contained in that of another expression. Now, our perception of meanings must come to the conclusion that they occur in such content-bearing linguistic expressions called ideas in the mind (Locke, 1690/1955).

Mind bears considerable linguistic expressions as in beliefs, mental states, ideas, depictions, or a thought. Unfortunately, the mental states or ideations earlier convinced are not sufficiently giving exploration to the theory of meanings. So, here comes the main argument. Abstract mental states alone are considered far from being understood. Therefore, all these mental abstractions need to be then expressed through a string of marks or noises (in other words called sentences in the form of utterances)  where meanings are sensible for the actual states of particular people at particular times. If we go back to common-sense congeniality and meaning facts, this is wherein sentences make meaning because they possess propositions. A proposition is a key for a person to understand a sentence or S (clarified by Russel and Moore). Despite objections raised by some, the Proposition theory is believed to be the only theory so far that explains clearly the phenomena of linguistic meanings because, in this theory, meanings can be directly discovered from the truth-values from time to time and from context to context. It has collapsed the Ideational theory of meaning. Propositions are, nevertheless, abstract, however, people can strictly grasp ideas or apprehend meaning by understanding sentence (S) to grasp some proposition (P), knowing that S expresses P from the meaning facts and links them to logic. The writer here understands that a sentence contributes gibberish or non-sensical concepts without a proposition as its abstract conceptual parts. Proposition grants a sentence its permanent truth-values. Thus, propositions are fundamental in providing truth and falsity (read: meanings) in sentences.

The 'Use' Theory and Inferentialism

If meanings are abstract, how mysterious would they be? Wittgenstein (1953) and Austin (1961, 1962) think that there should be a direct way of finding meanings of language -- that finding meanings from the receiving end of the language use. The product of how the linguistic expressions are used is believed to be one way to reduce the mystery. They clarify that meanings are quickly learned and taught from certain social practices and conversational behaviors, referring to the use of language in daily communications -- not only constructing abstract meaning from separative sentences as proposed by the traditional theory of meaning. Wittgenstein himself states that finding linguistic meanings is like playing a game. He offers this as the critical analogy for understanding meanings -- playing with words, as he finds that meanings have been treated as static and inert by the Entity theory and too abstract by the Propositions theory. Although, the 'Use' theory takes in a little part of the Propositional theory -- that the meaning of utterances changes from time to time, context to context. It suggests that meanings are sensed through language use in different contexts. Thus, language is like a game wherein each game possesses distinctive sets of rules that govern the games. People must use the language appropriately according to the conversational settings.

In the context of social practices, words are used to accomplish a purpose of communication. For instance, thanking, disagreeing, apologizing, greeting, protesting, etc. Each purpose of the game has different sets of rules. Additionally, language games are played through a set of exquisite rules called the Family Resemblance. This terminology distinguishes language games where words are categorized into a group where similar words in the context of the language games are played in conversational settings. The commonalities can be that the words are all types of activities used by people who share a similar understanding of the rules and have purposes. The most important thing about using this rule is that the meaning of words or sentences is constructed by the people who use them.

      According to the 'Use' theory, it is vital that two speakers speak by rules in the social practices to make meanings purposeful in a clear context. Wittgenstein has solved the mystery. To be understood, words must be linked to reality; that is, people learn language from life -- from its everyday use. The philosophical viewpoint of Wittgenstein towards linguistic expressions is that he observes a nurturing culture where conversational and social practices take place. He believes that language develops from its use as the truth arises when people use the language in life.

Wittgenstein's Follower: Robert Brandom (1994)

Many are discontented with the 'Use' theory.  They accuse that the 'Use' theory fails to disclose a rule of proper names that every native speaker of the local dialect obeys without exception. Brandom (1994) explores the 'Use' theory further and explains that proper names as references are just a construct out of inferential practice defined on the whole sentences, and it does not fit to a subject for independent theorizing. Meaning should be observed from the whole context of reasoning in sentences. He defends that Inferentialism completes the 'Use' theory with a defense that it would take assertion as a support of reasoning in conversational practices.

            Some others are discontented with the theory that they find no exact conventions have ever been given for long utterances. Many would use an expression but mechanically do not understand the meanings. The conditions cannot say that the theory does not sufficiently support linguistic expressions into something being a language. Brandom, with his Inferentialism concept, developing the 'Use' theory, has once again worked out that sentences' overall meanings are found when words are strung together. The meaning is mentioned to be, in large part, becoming a function of its internal structure. Now, the use of linguistic expressions is not merely understood in conversations but also how the language is used through assertion as an actual act -- to defend oneself against whatever objections.