[caption id="" align="alignleft" width="640" caption="picture: israeliran.net"][/caption] This article will try to answer following questions: (1) would Israel attack Iran to stop its nuclear program and (2) what implications would it bring, Israel-Iran wide-scale conventional conflict, regionally and globally. The likelihood of Israeli attack to halt or even just delay Iranian nuclear weapons program is frequently portrayed from two level of analysis, international system and, now being more frequent, decision making process in Israel. Analyzing the issue at the level of analysis of international system, we would consider both Israel and Iran as two rational states seeking to ensure their own security by exploiting any mean to maximize their power. After all, security of one is threat to another. When one particular state increases its military capabilities, for example, the increasing would then be considered as threat to other states since the capabilities can be used anytime to attack other states. The states feeling threaten are then motivated to increase their own military capabilities. This vicious cycle is what scholars of International Relations call as security dilemma. To put it in the case, Iranian nuclear weapons program which will considerably increase its power and security would be seen as threat to other states, including Israel. The case is even worse with Israel and Iran are seeing each other as enemy –as President Ahmadinejad once said that Israel must be wiped off the map. As a rational actor seeking to ensure its own security, thus Israel has more than enough reasons to halt Iranian nuclear weapons program before it’s completed. In fact, it is an experience that any state has learned from that state arming itself with nuclear weapons is never been a good idea. Nucleared-Iran, Israel believes, would be destabilizing factors of regional and international politics. Remember North Korea which now frequently bluffing with its nuclear weapons anytime it has domestic needs to be fulfilled, name it food, oil etc. In other words, there should not be another North Korea. Other camp of analysts frequently links the likelihood of Israeli attack to Iran with the dynamic of the circle of decision making process within Israel itself. This analysis argues that the likelihood of such attack is a function of political calculations among Israeli leaders notably between right-wing, apocalyptic Prime Minister Ehud Barak and rational Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Wide-scale conventional conflict in Middle East has never been in anyone interest. The implications it would bring is too grave to imagine. Given its considerable volume of oil production and the fact that it’s located near a major line of oil transportation namely Hormuz Strait, a conflict involving Iran would rocket global oil price, not a preferable option for any country for sure. Given the above analysis, we come to conclusion that (1) it’s unlikely for Israel to initiate a wide-scale conflict with Iran. Nevertheless, Israel’s desire to halt Iranian nuclear weapon program is unquestionable. The very best we can expect probably is another kind of covert, limited, special operations by Israeli military and intelligence to neutralize Iran nuclear facilities. And we know Israel is very good in such operations –remember the big name of Mossad. But after all the complicated, seems-to-be-never-ending analysis at the levels of decision making process in Israel as well as international system, one thing to be not forgotten once and for all is that ‘Israel is not a normal state’. It’s a state which existence is still questioned by number of parties, from non-governmental, ideologically driven actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah to state with considerable military capabilities such as Iran itself. It’s a state living along the matter of survival. And when you’re in the matter of survival, you would take any possible options on the table for not being vanished. __________________ This essay is summarized from ISAFIS Biweekly Discussion III 28 April 2012 by Muhammad Arif, Director of Division of Research and Development with the help from other staffs of RnD. Some arguments in this essay may not be precisely same with what the speakers said in the discussion. Further confirmation is applicable.
