RECENT showdown in South China Sea between Indonesian Navy and China’s Coast Guard has reinvigorated public interest towards the region. Some applauded Indonesia’s resolve in defending her rightful maritime territory. However, some are still left wondering over China’s motives in provoking such regional conflict – including with VietNam, Malaysia, and Philippines. How can one explain why China risks a major war that could potentially drag the U.S. in for bunch of uninhabited rocks?
Some say they are fighting for the control over major oil and gas reserve in those seas. But this seems not to be the case. After all, great-powers rarely (if any) fight one another in a major war over economic resources throughout modern history. Or is it because China’s nine-dash line? For sure, one needs to differentiate the means, ways, and ends of phenomena. Nine-dash line is a mean that China uses to justify its policy. But it does not explain the end-game it wants to achieve – therefore, it cannot be used to explain its motives in South China Sea.
LET’S take a look back into 20th century, shall we. World War I started when Austria-Hungary declared war and attacked Serbia. So, does it mean that World War I was caused by Austria-Hungary’s invasion? No. Austria-Hungary did start the war, but it certainly not caused it. The cause of the war was great-powers’ concern among the prevalent regional order in Europe – and their wish to alter it.
The Germans (together with Austro-Hungarian) uncomfortably looked at the shifting of balance of power towards the French-Russian (and British possibly, but not definitively) alliance. They saw the erosion of Germany’s dominance over European order (which it achieved since 1871) while looking for a way to reverse the trend. The French and Russian, boosted with its newly gained power – and had been humiliated during Germans’ led order before – were also looking for a way to punish Germany – and her allied.
As with World War I, World War II did start with an invasion. It started when Hitler invaded Poland. However, Poland was not the cause of the Anglo-French and German rivalry – that will escalate to a war in 1939. Instead, the Anglo-French were concerned over the shifting balance of power towards German’s favor and sought to prevent it from going further in that direction. That determination finally leads to war over Poland’s survival.
Put it simply, what Serbia, Poland, and South China Sea (and East China Sea) shares in common is that they become the venue of great powers rivalry. While being so, they definitely not the cause of that rivalry.
UNDERSTANDING the cause of current Sino-American rivalry, one needs to see the history and strategic picture of Asia region. Put it simply, one needs to see beyond South China Sea. Following the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II, the U.S. is the sole great-power that can project its power throughout the region. Since that day, the region has come under American-led regional order. Having only a fraction of U.S.’ power, other states in the region accepted American primacy.
What is happening today is that China has gathered enough power and becoming powerful enough to match (or even surpass) U.S.’ ability to project power throughout much of Asia. Power (hard-power) means leadership throughout the history and with its newly gained power, China wants a bigger role in the regional leadership. For sure, though seems weird for most people, anyone who carefully study history will concede that this is a normal through arguably regrettable state behavior.
One might point finger towards Japan and Germany as comparisons – which both rise of power in recent times does not corresponds with a regional crisis that risks regional war – and, therefore, accused China’s behavior as not normal. However, history once again shows that both states are the anomaly – not China.
As charismatic Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, “Unlike other emergent countries, China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West.” It is clear from his observation that China sets its sight to displace the U.S. as the dominant power that will dictate the regional order in Asia region.
This is not to say that we must agree with and/or accept all China want to do. We may dislike how our rival thinks and behave, but we have to understand them. Without understanding how China thinks, a plausible solution to current conflict will be hard to devise.
